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Doubting Free Will: Three Experiments
by John A. Humbach, Pace Law School
White Plains, New York

At another place I have argued that hurting people is presumptively wrong and
that, because this is so, any act to inflict human suffering needs to be justified.1
Moreover, I have claimed, the justifications for infliction require evidence, and because
infliction is presumptively wrong, the burden is on the inflictors to justify the infliction.2
This moral presumption against infliction of suffering has particular relevance in
the field of criminal law because, as a system of retribution, the criminal justice system is
institutionally committed to the infliction of human suffering. Simply put, suffering is
inflicted to make people “pay” for the crimes that they commit. Of course, the criminal
justice system often has other goals as well (e.g., prevention of crime through deterrence,
incapacitation or rehabilitation). Nonetheless, insofar as retribution remains a significant
force shaping criminal justice policy, the intentional infliction of human suffering is the
aim.
A core justification for the intentional infliction of human suffering on criminals
is rooted in the idea of “free will,” the notion that criminals freely choose to engage in
criminal conduct. For if criminals did not choose to commit their crimes, if their acts
were literally dictated by causes beyond their control, then criminals would seem no more
to be morally “responsible” for their misdeeds than the victims who suffer the wrong.
The law would routinely excuse a person who steals with a gun to his head or whose car
is hit from behind and strikes a pedestrian.3 And though the causal chain may be more
complicated or obscure in the case of human conduct, there is no known physical reason
(i.e., non-mystical reason) why this same principle could not be extended to criminal
conduct generally.
However, the mere suggestion that this principle should be extended criminal acts
generally sounds insensitive and morally obtuse. So deep and powerful is our human
appetite for retribution that the mind recoils at the thought that it could possibly be wrong
to make criminals pay for their crimes. The fact remains, however, that millennia of
inquiry and debate have still not produced definitive evidence that free will either does or
does not exist. The evidence of “free will” needed to justify retributive infliction still has
not emerged. On the contrary, recent developments in the study of the brain and its role in
human behavior have cast serious doubt on the free will hypothesis. There is no empirical

1

See my companion paper, Free Will Ideology: Experiments, Evolution and Virtue Ethics 1-3 (January 12,
2010), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1428002. This paper, supplying and discussing
additional details of certain experiments, is intended to supplement and support the companion paper. Id.
2
Id. at 3-5.
3
In the words of the Model Penal Code, such a person would not be considered to have committed a
“voluntary act.” MODEL PENAL CODE §2.01 (1962).
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evidence that any event ever occurs within the brain or central nervous system that does
not have an ordinary physical cause.4
This working paper describes three previously reported experiments that tend to
cast doubt on free will. All deal with the phenomenon that, for a variety of reasons,
people do not consciously experience events at the exact instant they occur. There is, for
example, a delay, measurable in hundreds of milliseconds, between the time that photons
hit the retinas of our eyes and the ensuing nerve impulses register visually in our brains.
This kind of delay in perception is, of course, well known and its physical explanation
(i.e., the need for travel time) is well understood. There are, however, other perception
delays that may be more surprising.
The experiments described here concern the delay that intervenes between the
time that we make a “decision” and the time that we actually know, or consciously
experience, that the decision has been made. While we usually feel that we consciously
experience decisions at the instant they are made, experiments show this is not the case.
On the contrary, the experiments appear to show that people do not become consciously
aware that they have made a behavioral choice until at least 300 milliseconds (1/3
second) or so after the choice has been made. In other words, we go through life ‘seeing’
the decisions we make roughly 1/3 of a second (or more) after we make them. The
existence of these delays is sufficient to cast serious doubt on the possibility of conscious
free will, i.e., free will as we usually understand it.
The three experiments described here demonstrate this 1/3 second delay. They are
the Phi Effect, Libet’s experiments and the experiments of W. Grey Walter.5
1. The Phi Effect—The “phi effect” (discovered by the Gestalt psychologist Max
Wertheimer in 19126) refers to the illusion of motion that makes moving pictures
possible. The phi effect occurs, for example, when a series of images is flashed before the
eyes in quick succession, each slightly out of register with the previous. The result is that
4

Among the sources that I have consulted in forming my own understanding of the structure and workings
of the brain, mind and central nervous system are: PAUL M. CHURCHLAND, THE ENGINE OR REASON, THE SEAT OF
THE MIND (1996); IRA B. BLANK, INFORMATION IN THE BRAIN: A MOLECULAR PERSPECTIVE (1994); RICHARD M.
RESTACK, RECEPTORS (1994); ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR: EMOTION, REASON AND THE HUMAN BRAIN
(1994); PATRICIA S. CHURCHLAND AND TERRENCE J. SEJNOWSKI, THE COMPUTATIONAL BRAIN (1992); OWEN
FLANAGAN, CONSCIOUSNESS RECONSIDERED (1992); NICHOLAS HUMPHREY, A HISTORY OF THE MIND (1992); ARNOLD
TREHUB, THE COGNATIVE BRAIN (1991); DANIEL C. DENNETT, CONSCIOUSNESS EXPLAINED (1991); PAUL M.
CHURCHLAND, A NEUROCOMPUTATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (1989); ROGER PENROSE, THE EMPEROR’S NEW MIND:
CONCERNING COMPUTERS, MINDS AND THE LAW OF PHYSICS (1989); DAVID H. HUBEL, EYE, BRAIN AND VISION (1988);
JOHN H. HOLLAND ET AL., INDUCTION: PROCESSES OF INFERENCE, LEARNING AND DISCOVERY (1988); PATRICIA S.
CHURCHLAND, NEUROPHILOSOPHY: TOWARD A UNIFIED SCIENCE OF THE MIND/BRAIN (1986); JEAN-PIERRE CHANGEUX,
NEURONAL MAN: THE BIOLOGY OF THE MIND (1985). It should be stressed, however, that the details of
neuroscience, while a fascinating topic, do not play a necessary role in reaching the conclusions sought to
be supported here or in the companion paper that this one supports. Supra note 1.
5
I became first aware of these experiments in Daniel Dennett’s excellent and far more extensive treatment
of the subject in his book CONSCIOUSNESS EXPLAINED. DENNETT, supra note 4, at 114-15, 162-66, 167. Other
citations to reports of the experiments are along with the pertinent text discussion infra.
6
Wertheimer, M., Experimentelle Studien über das Sehen von Bewegung, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PSYCHOLOGIE 61:
161-265 (1912).
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the objects depicted seem to move smoothly from one location to another, as they do in
movies and on television. Moreover, in moving smoothly from place to place, the
depicted objects appear to occupy a continuous succession of locations in the space
between the starting and ending points—including locations where none of the actual
images put them. This illusion occurs because brain fills in the gaps; instead of a series of
jerking moves we see only one continuous transition. This is the “phi effect.”
The phi-effect experiment of particular relevance here involves two small spots of
light that are flashed close to the eyes in quick succession.7 The lights are arranged so
they are both within four degrees of visual angle. Typically, each light is flashed for 150
milliseconds, with a 50-millisecond interval of darkness between them. As might be
expected from the phi effect, the observer does not see two discrete flashes but instead
sees a small luminous “ball” that appears move swiftly from the first flash location to the
second and then disappear.
Now a question that presents itself is this: Is the observer consciously aware that
her brain initially ‘sees’ the two successive flashes as flashes (at the instants when her
brain initially registers the processed nerve impulses from each)?8 The answer is
apparently not. At any rate, the observers in the experiments do not remember seeing
either flash. All they remember seeing is a smoothly moving ball.
But the odd thing revealed by the phi-effect experiments is that, even though the
observers apparently never recall seeing the two flashes as flashes, it seems that their
brains can ‘see’ them, process them and react to them. Specifically, when the observers
are told to immediately push a button if the first light is red, but not otherwise, they
manage to perform the task. Apparently, the observer’s brain (if not mind) can ‘see’ the
first light come on and alter her behavior in response, before the second light comes on.
Moreover, they do so with reaction times that indicate their brains are able to process the
first light and generate a correct behavioral response whether or not the second light ever
comes on. That is, their brains are able to ‘see’ the first flash, and regulate the observer’s
behavior in response to it, in less time than it takes for the second light to appear (i.e., less
than 200 milliseconds).
What the phi experiments also reveal is that the observer sees the first light in
different ways (flash or moving ball), depending on whether the second light comes on. If
the second light does not come on, the first light will appear as simply a single nonmoving flash. If, on the other hand, the second light does come on, the observer never
recalls seeing the first light as a flash, but only as a smoothly moving ball. What is more,
the ball seems to start moving at once, roughly 200 milliseconds (1/5 second) before the
second light comes on. If there are several possible locations for the second light to
7

Apparently the first to do this experiment were Kolers and von Grünau. See Kolers, P.A. & von Grünau,
M. , Shape and Color in Apparent Motion, 16 VISION RESEARCH 329-335 (1976). Analogous results, but
using the tactile rather than visual sense, have been produced by the so-called ‘cutaneous rabbit”
experiments done by Frank Geldard and Carl Sherrick. See DENNETT, supra note 4, at 142-43.
8
The phrase “the brain …‘sees’” is a metaphorical shorthand. What it refers to is the point at which the
impulses originating at the retina have arrived the brain and been processed to such an extent that a
neuronal representation or “image” of the visual scene has been formed.
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appear, the direction of the ball’s motion appears to be toward the place where the second
light will later come on. In short, the observer seems to ‘know’ in advance whether and
where the second light will appear (so as to form the picture of the moving ball) as much
as 200 milliseconds before the time of the second light.
An even more dramatic phi-effect experiment involves two flashes of different
colors—red and green. Now as the two flashes are presented, the illusory moving ball
appears to abruptly change color, from red to green, halfway between the locations where
the actual flashes occur. Obviously, the brain does not have the information it needs to
correctly change the color (produce a different colored illusion) until after the raw data
from the second flash has been processed off the cerebral end of the optic nerve. Once
again, the observer seems to ‘know’ in advance what is going to happen before the
second event occurs.
Assuming that the observers in these experiments are not actually able to look
into the future, what the phi-effect experiments show is there must be some delay
between the time when a person’s brain ‘sees’ something (and is able to act on it), and the
time when the person becomes conscious of what she sees. The observers in the phieffect experiments could not have been seeing the first light as a moving ball until after
their the second light came on, yet their brains were able to adjust their behavior based on
the specifics of initial flash before the second light came on. That is, long before9 the
observers saw the first light in their conscious awareness, their brains had already ‘seen’
it and could have acted on it and moved on to something else. Conscious awareness of
the two successive flashes was delayed until after both events had occurred (and was
modified, as well), but there was no such delay in the brain’s ability to discern what it
‘saw’ and to control behavior accordingly.10
The phi-effect experiments mean at least this: If the observers in the experiments
had in fact ever consciously seen the two lights flash on and off, the memory of it must
have been obliterated—replaced by a false memory of a moving ball. Another
explanation is, more simply, that people do not see anything in conscious awareness until
a many milliseconds after the scene has been ‘seen’ (unconsciously) and possibly even
acted on by their brains. Though other evidence11 seems to favor the ‘delay’ hypothesis
over the false-memory hypothesis, there is probably not for present purposes much
practical difference between them. If there are conscious goings-on inside our heads that

9

That is to say, ‘long before’ in terms of brain processing time. Other experiments, described below,
indicate that the delay in something under 1/3 second.
10
Note that, in addition to the delay I am focusing on here, there is also some delay (mentioned earlier) in
the retina’s response, in the travel down the optic nerve and in the brain’s visual processing to form the
cerebral “image”—viz. the pattern of synaptic discharges that first reconstitutes the photonic impressions on
the retina as a visual ‘object’ in the brain. These delays are not, however, the ones that we are talking about
now. The question here is whether concerns the delay between the time that the visual processing regions of
the brain have produced their visual object, of which one will be consciously aware, and the time at which
one actually is consciously aware of that visual object. The evidence of the phi-experiments is that there is
such a delay.
11
See discussion of Libet and Grey Walter experiments, infra.
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we never find out about because our memory of them is routinely obliterated within
milliseconds, they are pretty much indistinguishable from ‘unconscious’ mental events.12
One last point: Even if there is a systematic delay in our becoming consciously
aware of images and decisions on them (and, by implication, other thoughts and
sensations in our brains), we nonetheless feel like we see things as happening the instant
they occur. That is to say, we are not consciously aware of the delay. Nor, for that matter,
are we consciously aware of the inherent delays that are needed for retinal response, optic
nerve transmission or visual processing. The brain automatically compensates for all
these delays by “referring back” our memories in time—so the picture we get is, for
example, that the hammer hits the nail at the instant of actual impact—not hundreds of
milliseconds later, when our brain finally reports the scenario to our conscious
awareness.13 Ditto if the hammer is coming down on our thumb: Even though we don’t
consciously see it coming down in time to respond, the phi-effect experiments indicate
that the brain can ‘see’ it coming down and even unconsciously send instructions to the
arm to pull the thumb away.
This ability to process inputs and act on them unconsciously has, of course, great
practical importance in a number of ways. It means we are far more effective than we
otherwise would be where quick reactions are required. A tennis player returning a volley
can assess the ball’s trajectory, decide where to place it and even hit it before (in real
time) she is consciously aware that her brain has already ‘seen’ the ball coming across the
net. The whole story of the ball’s path and destiny arrives in conscious awareness only
12

The most satisfying explanation for me seen is something on the order Dennett’s so-called ‘multiple
drafts’ model. It supposes, as I understand it, that various provisional representations (‘drafts’) of external
encounters go flashing around the brain’s neural network as the perceptual information comes in, until
‘some threshold of activation’ is exceeded ‘over the whole cortex or large parts thereof,’ at which point a
resultant subjective experience arrives in consciousness. See DENNETT, supra note 4, at 168 and 101-38; see
also Stephen M. Fleming et al., When the Brain Changes Its Mind: Flexibility of Action Selection in
Instructed and Free Choices, CEREBRAL CORTEX 7, doi:10.1093/cercor/bhn252 (Feb. 11, 2009) (describing
the decision between internally generated choices as being prompted “perhaps simply because of
randomness
in
neural
firing”),
available
at
http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/~sfleming/Fleming_CerCor2009.pdf; Jeffrey M. Beck et al., Probabilistic
Population Codes for Bayesian Decision Making, 60 NEURON 1142-52 (2008) (describing experiments done
by
co-author
Alexandre
Pouget),
available
at
http://www.bcs.rochester.edu/people/alex/pub/articles/BecketalNeuron08.pdf (on efficacy of neural
networks in resolving probabilistic problems through the use of mathematical attractors). Moreover, I think
that Dennett’s model would allow (and I tend to believe) that definitive or ‘final’ conscious representations
of perceptions and decisions do not necessary ever have to ‘come together’ and arrive in consciousness at
all as we navigate our way through life. Instead of routinely experiencing a running final-edit
representation of the world generated (with delay) ‘on the fly,’ we would normally have conscious
experience of a final-edit version, if at all, only in retrospect, in the form of recollections—possibly well
after the fact. See DENNETT, supra note 4, at 134-38; and id. at 125-26 and 169 (‘no moment can count as the
precise moment at which a conscious event happens’’); but cf. id. at 137 (seeming to insist on need for
‘rolling consciousness’ in order to negotiate a car through traffic); and id. at 169 (‘no moment can count as
the precise moment at which a conscious event happens’’). If indeed we do not routinely have an on-the-fly
conscious experience of internal and external events, summoning recollections only when we need them,
this would imply, among other things, that what is normally referred to as ‘introspection’ is, in reality,
retrospection.
13
See discussion of Libet and Grey Walter experiments, infra.
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after it’s all over. Of course, if we did not have this ability, we could not play tennis, ride
a bicycle, drive safely in traffic, dodge a flying object (or a punch), or do anything else
where fast response times are crucial. The larger point is, however, that our brains have
the ability to make ‘choices’ and implement them by sending motor impulses to muscles,
before we are even consciously aware that the ‘choices’ have been made.
2. Libet’s experiments—Experiments conducted by Benjamin Libet likewise
show that ‘the initiation of the freely voluntary act appears to begin in the brain
unconsciously, well before the person consciously knows he wants to act.’14 In Libet’s
experiments, people were told to gaze at a specially designed clock and flick their right
wrists ‘whenever’ they wanted to do so.15 They were also told to pay close attention to the
clock and note the exact instant when they first felt the urge, desire, or decision to flick.
The people in the experiment were connected to electroencephalographs, which showed
the exact time when their brains became ready send out motor impulses to their hands
(the so-called ‘readiness potential'). When the brain is ready to send out motor impulses
to the body, that means, in effect, that the decision to act has been made.16
The key finding was that the experimental subjects did not become consciously
aware that they had decided to flick their wrists until at least 1/3 of a second after the
measured onset of readiness potential in their brains: ‘Clearly,’ Libet writes, ‘the brain
process … to prepare for this voluntary act began about 400 msec. before the appearance
of the conscious will to act.’17 (The actual wrist flick came about 200 milliseconds later
still.18) In short, decisions come first, then the conscious awareness of them.
To anyone who has jammed on the brakes in a car when a person or object
suddenly appears in the road just ahead, the idea that decisions to act can occur
‘unconsciously’ is perfectly familiar. Nevertheless, the implications of Libet’s
experiment put a particular focus on the question: Is conscious awareness a necessary
part of decisionmaking at all? After all, the actions of Libet's subjects were not sudden,
reactive or unexpected, but were in pursuance of instructions to sit and flick their wrists
whenever they wanted to do so. They had to make up their minds. Some of the subjects
reported that they ‘roughly’ preplanned their flicks, but the time results were the same
with or without such preplanning.19
The fact that consciousness of a decision appears significantly after the neuronal
decision has ‘a fundamental impact on how we could view free will.’20 Apparently,
however, Libet himself (as a freewill aficionado) does not interpret his experiments as
14

Benjamin Libet, Do We Have Free Will?, 6 J. CONSCIOUSNESS STUDIES 47, 51 (1999), available at
http://m0134.fmg.uva.nl/publications_others/BLfreewill.pdf.. The experiments are also described in
FLANAGAN, supra note 4, at 136-38; DENNETT, supra note 4, at 162-66; and Andrew E. Lelling, Eliminative
Materialism, Neuroscience and the Criminal Law, 141 U.Pa. L. Rev. 1471, 1520-26 (1995).
15
Libet, supra note 14, at 50.
16
FLANAGAN, supra note 4, at 136.
17
Libet, supra note 14, at 50.
18
Id.
19
Libet, supra note 14, at 50 & 53.
20
Libet, supra note 14, at 49.
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necessarily excluding a role for conscious choice.21 He points out that the people in his
studies said they felt like they were still able to intervene and veto the actual wristflicking once they became aware of their decisions to flick. And, Libet reports, such a
veto was physically possible: The timing of the events would leave a 1/10 second
window of opportunity between when the decision appeared consciously and the
impulses went out to the muscles, and during this 1/10 second interval a countermand
could be interposed.22 As he put it, ‘the conscious function [has] the possibility of
stopping or vetoing the final progress of the volitional process, so that no actual muscle
action ensues.’23 This being so, Libet posits a version of free will that would work like
this: ‘We may view the unconscious initiatives for voluntary actions as “bubbling up” in
the brain. The conscious-will then selects which of these initiatives may go forward to an
action or which ones to veto and abort, with no act appearing.’24 This power of final
conscious control, Libet contends, is the locus of action for free will.
The interpretation by Libet of his own data is, however, a bit of a mystery. If it
takes 350 milliseconds for the initial neuronal ‘decision’ to appear in consciousness and
another 150 or so for it to start down the pipe to the muscles, why does Libet assume that
a veto decision can spring to life and have its full effect almost instantly? It would seem
more consistent with his experimental results to suppose that the conscious ‘vetoes’
reported by his subjects were, like the initial ‘conscious decisions,’ also 350 millisecond
post-cursors of the actual operative decisions that they reflected. In other words, it seems
more plausible (from the data) that both the decisions to flick and to veto were made
unconsciously.
Libet, however, does not like the idea that the vetoes are decided unconsciously.
To meet the objection that vetoes need (like the initial decisions) to be generated in
unconscious processes, he points out that the factors affecting conscious veto decisions
would not need to have separate preconscious processing; the factors entering into the
conscious veto decision could be already processed as part of the package of factors that
were preconsciously pulled together in generating the initial decision to act. From the
freewill standpoint, however, there is a serious problem with this solution: First, it
essentially concedes that the factors going into the initial decision, pro and con, are
selected and assembled unconsciously. Then comes the opening for conscious free will,
after initial decision and pro-and-con factors appear in consciousness. At that point the
person has 1/10 second to make a conscious ‘go-no go’ judgment.25 But on what basis is
that judgment to be made? Based on the factors selected and assembled by the
unconscious? By way of some random process? A quantum event? Libet argues
hopefully that ‘the conscious decision to veto could still be made without direct
specification for that decision by the preceding unconscious processes.’26 Maybe. But
21

See Libet, supra note 14, at 51-53 and FLANAGAN, supra note 4, at 136. See the further very illuminating
discussion of this in Lelling, supra note 14, at 1523-26.
22
Libet, supra note 14, at 51.
23
Libet, supra note 14, at 51
24
Libet, supra note 14, at 54.
25
‘The possibility is not excluded that factors, on which the decision to veto (control) is based, do develop
by unconscious processes that precede the veto.’ Libet, supra note 14, at 53.
26
Id. (emph. in original).
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relegating free will to 1/10 second snap decisions hardly provides a very convincing
ground for imposing guilt and personal responsibility
If, on the other hand, we interpret the vetoes consistently with the other
experimental data, we are led to the plausible conclusion that both the decisions to flick
and to veto were made unconsciously. Consciousness then reflects but does not deflect
the physical course of brain activity or motor impulses leading to behavior.27
3. W. Grey Walter’s experiments—Perhaps the most dramatic experiments
were those done by William Grey Walter.28 He placed his subjects facing a screen on
which photographic slides were projected. The subjects were told to use a hand-button to
advance the slides at will. As in Libet’s experiments, the subjects were connected to
devices that measured the readiness potential in the area of the brain thought to subserve
hand movement. As such, the devices could reveal when the ‘decision’ was made in the
brain, and this decision-time could be compared with the (later) time when the subject
pushed the hand-button. However, unknown to the subjects, Grey Walter had hooked the
brain measuring devices directly to the slide projector. As a result, it was the readiness
potential (decision) in their brains, not the hand-button, that actually advanced the slides.
The subjects were startled to see the slides advance, as per their decisions, before they
were even consciously aware that they had made the decisions.
Conclusion
These experiments do not definitely exclude the possibility of free will. They do,
however, provide affirmative evidence that our brains do not consciously make decisions
in quite the way that introspection tells us. This evidence should at very least cast serious
doubt on the degree to which we can trust our subjective introspections about the
existence of free will. And this doubt throws into question the factual basis of the freewill
justification for purposefully inflicting serious human suffering.
*****
For a further discussion of the implications of these experiments for the freewill
justification of punishment, see my companion paper, Free Will Ideology: Experiments,
Evolution and Virtue Ethics 1-3 (January 12, 2010), available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1428002.

27

See also the generally concordant views of Andrew Lelling, at Lelling, supra note 14, at 1523-26. There
have also been other explanations for Libet’s results, notably Dennett’s. See DANIEL C. DENNETT, FREEDOM
EVOLVES 227-42 (2003). But Dennett’s explanation tends to be significantly more intricate than the
straightforward ‘delayed consciousness’ explanation and, contrary to the counsel of Occam’s Razor, to
‘multiply entities’ that do not themselves have independent experimental verification (e.g., ‘free will takes
time’). Id.
28
Described in Daniel C. Dennett and Marcel Kinsbourne, Time and the Observer, in NED BLOCK, OWEN
FLANIGAN, ET AL., THE NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS: PHILOSOPHICAL DEBATES 141, 168 (1997). Apparently Grey
Walter only delivered the results of his experiments orally and never in writing. See DENNETT, supra note 27,
at 240 n.2.
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